Decenber 2: Bhopal Disaster

Good morning friends,
Today iam describing about the bhopal tragedy.............

The Bhopal disaster also known as Bhopal Gas Tragedy was a gas leak incident in India, considered one of the world's worst industrial catastrophes. It occurred on the night of December 2–3, 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India. A leak of methyl isocyanate gas and other chemicals from the plant resulted in the exposure of hundreds of thousands of people. Estimates vary on the death toll. The official immediate death toll was 2,259 and the government of Madhya Pradesh has confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the gas release Others estimate 3,000 died within weeks and another 8,000 have since died from gas-related diseases. A government affidavit in 2006 stated the leak caused 558,125 injuries including 38,478 temporary partial and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries.
UCIL was the Indian subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC). Indian Government controlled banks and the Indian public held 49.1 percent ownership share. In 1994, the Supreme Court of India allowed UCC to sell its 50.9 percent share. Union Carbide sold UCIL, the Bhopal plant operator, to Eveready Industries India Limited in 1994. The Bhopal plant was later sold to McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. Dow Chemical Company purchased UCC in 2001.
Civil and criminal cases are pending in the United States District Court, Manhattan and the District Court of Bhopal, India, involving UCC, UCIL employees, and Warren Anderson, UCC CEO at the time of the disaster. In June 2010, seven ex-employees, including the former UCIL chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of about $2,000 each, the maximum punishment allowed by law. An eighth former employee was also convicted, but died before judgment was passed.
The UCIL factory was built in 1969 to produce the pesticide Sevin (UCC's brand name for carbaryl) using methyl isocyanate (MIC) as an intermediate. An MIC production plant was added in 1979.^[8][9][10]
During the night of December 2–3, 1984, water entered a tank containing 42 tons of MIC. The resulting exothermic reaction increased the temperature inside the tank to over 200 °C (392 °F) and raised the pressure. The tank vented releasing toxic gases into the atmosphere. The gases were blown by southeasterly winds over Bhopal.
Theories differ as to how the water entered the tank. At the time, workers were cleaning out a clogged pipe with water about 400 feet from the tank. The operators assumed that owing to bad maintenance and leaking valves, it was possible for the water to leak into the tank. However, this water entry route could not be reproduced. UCC also maintains that this route was not possible, but instead alleges water was introduced directly into the tank as an act of sabotage by a disgruntled worker via a connection to a missing pressure gauge on the top of the tank. Early the next morning, a UCIL manager asked the instrument engineer to replace the gauge. UCIL's investigation team found no evidence of the necessary connection; however, the investigation was totally controlled by the government denying UCC investigators access to the tank or interviews with the operatorsThe 1985 reports give a picture of what led to the disaster and how it developed, although they differ in details.
Factors leading to the magnitude of the gas leak include:

• Storing MIC in large tanks and filling beyond recommended levels
• Poor maintenance after the plant ceased MIC production at the end of 1984
• Failure of several safety systems (due to poor maintenance)
• Safety systems being switched off to save money—including the MIC tank refrigeration system which could have mitigated the disaster severity

The problem was made worse by the mushrooming of slums in the vicinity of the plant, non-existent catastrophe plans, and shortcomings in health care and socio-economic rehabilitation.

Equipment and safety regulations

It emerged in 1998, during civil action suits in India, that the plant was not prepared for problems. No action plans had been established to cope with incidents of this magnitude. This included not informing local authorities of the quantities or dangers of chemicals used and manufactured at Bhopal.

• The MIC tank alarms had not worked for four years.
• There was only one manual back-up system, compared to a four-stage system used in the US.
• The flare tower and several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service for five months before the disaster. Only one gas scrubber was operating, and it could not treat such a great amuont of MIC with sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), bringing the concentration down to a safe level. In fact, The maximum amount of MIC the scrubber could handle was only a quarter of the pressure during the leak. The flare tower could only hold a quarter of the gas that leaked in 1984, and moreover it was out of order at the time of the incident.
• To reduce energy costs, the refrigeration system was idle. The MIC was kept at 20 degrees Celsius, not the 4.5 degrees advised by the manual
• The steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes, was out of action for unknown reasons.
• Slip-blind plates that would have prevented water from pipes being cleaned from leaking into the MIC tanks through faulty valves were not installed. Their installation had been omitted from the cleaning checklist.
• The water pressure was too weak to spray the escaping gases from the stack. They could not spray high enough to reduce the concentration of escaping gas.
• According to the operators the MIC tank pressure gauge had been malfunctioning for roughly a week. Other tanks were used rather than repairing the gauge. The build-up in temperature and pressure is believed to have affected the magnitude of the gas release. UCC investigation studies have disputed this hypothesis.
• Carbon steel valves were used at the factory, even though they corrode when exposed to acid.
• UCC admitted in their own investigation report that most of the safety systems were not functioning on the night of December 3, 1984
• The design of the MIC plant, following government guidelines, was "Indianized" by UCIL engineers to maximize the use of indigenous materials and products. Mumbai based Humphreys and Glasgow Consultants PVT. Ltd. were the main consultants, Larsen and Toubro fabricated the MIC storage tanks, and Taylor of India Ltd. provided the instrumentation

Previous warnings and incidents

A series of prior warnings and MIC-related incidents had occurred:

• In 1976, the two trade unions reacted because of pollution within the plant.
• In 1981, a worker was splashed with phosgene. In panic he ripped off his mask, thus inhaling a large amount of phosgene gas; he died 72 hours later.
• In January 1982, there was a phosgene leak, when 24 workers were exposed and had to be admitted to hospital. None of the workers had been ordered to wear protective masks.
• In February 1982, an MIC leak affected 18 workers.
• In August 1982, a chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30 percent of his body.
• In October 1982, there was a leak of MIC, methylcarbaryl chloride, chloroform and hydrochloric acid. In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered intensive chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases.
• During 1983 and 1984, leaks of the following substances regularly took place in the MIC plant: MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in combination.
• Reports issued months before the incident by UCC engineers warned of the possibility of an incident almost identical to that which occurred in Bhopal. The reports never reached UCC's senior management.
• UCC was warned by American experts who visited the plant after 1981 of the potential of a "runaway reaction" in the MIC storage tank. Local Indian authorities warned the company of problems on several occasions from 1979 onwards.

The leakage

In November 1984, most of the safety systems were not functioning. Many valves and lines were in poor condition. Tank 610 contained 42 tons of MIC (disputed), much more than safety rules allowed. During the nights of 2–3 December, a large amount of water is claimed to have entered tank 610. A runaway reaction started, which was accelerated by contaminants, high temperatures and other factors. The reaction generated a major increase in the temperature inside the tank to over 200 °C (400 °F). This forced the emergency venting of pressure from the MIC holding tank, releasing a large volume of toxic gases. The reaction was sped up by the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines. Workers cleaned pipelines with water and claim they were not told to isolate the tank with a pipe slip-blind plate. Because of this, and the bad maintenance, the workers consider it possible for water to have accidentally entered the tank UCC maintains that a "disgruntled worker" deliberately connected a hose to a pressure gauge connection

Short term health effects

The leakage caused many short term health effects in the surrounding areas. Apart from MIC, the gas cloud may have contained phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, carbon monoxide, hydrogen chloride, oxides of nitrogen, monomethyl amine (MMA) and carbon dioxide, either produced in the storage tank or in the atmosphere.
The gas cloud was composed mainly of materials denser than the surrounding air, stayed close to the ground and spread outwards through the surrounding community. The initial effects of exposure were coughing, vomiting, severe eye irritation and a feeling of suffocation. People awakened by these symptoms fled away from the plant. Those who ran inhaled more than those who had a vehicle to ride. Owing to their height, children and other people of shorter stature inhaled higher concentrations. Many people were trampled trying to escape.
Thousands of people had succumbed by the morning hours. There were mass funerals and mass cremations as well as disposal of bodies in the Narmada river. 170,000 people were treated at hospitals and temporary dispensaries. 2,000 buffalo, goats, and other animals were collected and buried. Within a few days, leaves on trees yellowed and fell off. Supplies, including food, became scarce owing to suppliers' safety fears. Fishing was prohibited causing further supply shortages.
A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being "gas affected", affecting a population of 520,000. Of these, 200,000 were below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant women. In 1991, 3,928 deaths had been certified. Independent organizations recorded 8,000 dead in the first days. Other estimations vary between 10,000 and 30,000. Another 100,000 to 200,000 people are estimated to have permanent injuries of different degrees.
The acute symptoms were burning in the respiratory tract and eyes, blepharospasm, breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting. The causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver and necrotising enteritis. The stillbirth rate increased by up to 300% and neonatal mortality rate by 200%.

Hydrogen cyanide debate

Whether hydrogen cyanide was present in the gas mixture is still a controversy. Exposed to high temperatures, MIC breaks down to hydrogen cyanide (HCN). According to Kulling and Lorin, at +200 °C, 3% of the gas is HCN However, according to another scientific publication, MIC when heated in the gas-phase starts to break down to hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and other products above 400 °C. Concentrations of 300 ppm can lead to immediate collapse.
Laboratory replication studies by CSIR and UCC scientists failed to detect any HCN or HCN-derived side products. Chemically, HCN is known to be very reactive with MIC. HCN is also known to react with hydrochloric acid, ammonia, and methylamine (also produced in tank 610 during the vigorous reaction with water and chloroform) and also with itself under acidic conditions to form trimers of HCN called triazenes. None of the HCN-derived side products were detected in the tank residue.
The non-toxic antidote sodium thiosulfate (Na₂S₂O₃) in intravenous injections increases the rate of conversion from cyanide to non-toxic thiocyanate. Treatment was suggested earlyand tentatively used on some people, but it did not provide any significative relieve  In this way, bronchodilators were proven more effective as could in part reverse the acute respiratory failure caused by pulmonary edema due to MIC

Long term health effects

Victims of Bhopal disaster asking for Warren Anderson's extradition from the USA

It is estimated 100,000 to 200,000 people have permanent injuries. Reported symptoms are eye problems, respiratory difficulties, immune and neurological disorders, cardiac failure secondary to lung injury, female reproductive difficulties and birth defects among children born to affected women. The Indian Government and UCC deny permanent injuries were caused by MIC or the other gases.

Aftermath of the leakage

• Medical staff were unprepared for the thousands of casualties.
• Doctors and hospitals were not informed of proper treatment methods for MIC gas inhalation. They were told to simply give cough medicine and eye drops to their patients.
• The gases immediately caused visible damage to the trees. Within a few days, all the leaves fell off.
• 2,000 bloated animal carcasses had to be disposed of.
• "Operation Faith": On December 16, the tanks 611 and 619 were emptied of the remaining MIC. This led to a second mass evacuation from Bhopal.
• Complaints of a lack of information or misinformation were widespread. The Bhopal plant medical doctor did not have proper information about the properties of the gases. An Indian Government spokesman said that "Carbide is more interested in getting information from us than in helping our relief work."
• As of 2008, UCC had not released information about the possible composition of the cloud
• Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation and foodstuffs were safe within the city. At the same time, people were informed that poultry was unaffected, but were warned not to consume fish.

Compensation from Union Carbide

• The Government of India passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act that gave the government rights to represent all victims in or outside India.
• UCC offered US $350 million, the insurance sum. The Government of India claimed US$ 3.3 billion from UCC. In 1989, a settlement was reached under which UCC agreed to pay US$470 million (the insurance sum, plus interest) in a full and final settlement of its civil and criminal liability
• When UCC wanted to sell its shares in UCIL, it was directed by the Supreme Court to finance a 500-bed hospital for the medical care of the survivors. Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (BMHRC) was inaugurated in 1998. It was obliged to give free care for survivors for eight years.

Economic rehabilitation

• After the incident, no one under the age of 18 was registered. The number of children exposed to the gases was at least 200,000.
• Immediate relief was decided two days after the tragedy.
• Relief measures commenced in 1985 when food was distributed for a short period and ration cards were distributed.
• Widow pension of the rate of Rs 200/per month (later Rs 750) was provided.
• One-time ex-gratia payment of Rs 1,500 to families with monthly income Rs 500 or less was decided
• Each claimant was to be categorised by a doctor. In court, the claimants were expected to prove "beyond reasonable doubt" that death or injury in each case was attributable to exposure. In 1992, 44 percent of the claimants still had to be medically examined.
• From 1990 interim relief of Rs 200 was paid to everyone in the family who was born before the disaster.
• The final compensation (including interim relief) for personal injury was for the majority Rs 25,000 (US$ 830). For death claim, the average sum paid out was Rs 62,000 (US$ 2,058).
• Effects of interim relief were more children sent to school, more money spent on treatment, more money spent on food, improvement of housing conditions.
• The management of registration and distribution of relief showed many shortcomings.
• In 2007, 1,029,517 cases were registered and decided. Number of awarded cases were 574,304 and number of rejected cases 455,213. Total compensation awarded was Rs.1,546.47 crores.
• On June 24, the Union Cabinet of the Government of India approved a Rs1265cr aid package. It will be funded by Indian taxpayers through the government.

Occupational rehabilitation

• 33 of the 50 planned work-sheds for gas victims started. All except one was closed down by 1992.
• 1986, the MP government invested in the Special Industrial Area Bhopal. 152 of the planned 200 work-sheds were built. In 2000, 16 were partially functioning
• It is estimated that 50,000 persons need alternative jobs, and that less than 100 gas victims have found regular employment under the government's scheme

Habitation rehabilitation

• 2,486 flats in two- and four-story buildings were constructed in the "Widows colony" outside Bhopal. The water did not reach the upper floors. It was not possible to keep cattle. Infrastructure like buses, schools, etc. were missing for at least a decade.

Health care

• In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the health care system became tremendously overloaded. Within weeks, the State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics and mobile units in the gas-affected area.
• Radical health groups set up JSK (the People's Health Centre) that was working a few years from 1985
• Since the leak, a very large number of private practitioners have opened in Bhopal. In the severely affected areas, nearly 70 percent do not appear to be professionally qualified.
• The Government of India has focused primarily on increasing the hospital-based services for gas victims. Several hospitals have been built after the disaster. In 1994, there were approximately 1.25 beds per 1,000, compared to the recommendation from the World bank of 1.0 beds per 1,000 in developing countries.
• The Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (BMHRC) is a 350-bedded super speciality hospital. Heart surgery and hemodialysis are done. Major specialities missing are gynecology, obstetrics and pediatrics. Eight mini-units (outreach health centers) were started. Free health care for gas victims should be offered until 2006. The management has faced problems with strikes, and the quality of the health care is disputed.
• Sambhavna Trust is a charitable trust that registered in 1995. The clinic gives modern and Ayurvedic treatments to gas victims, free of charge.

Environmental rehabilitation

• When the factory was closed in 1985–1986, pipes, drums and tanks were sold. The MIC and the Sevin plants are still there, as are storages of different residues. Isolation material is falling down and spreading.

• The area around the plant was used as a dumping area for hazardous chemicals. In 1982 tubewells in the vicinity of the UCC factory had to be abandoned. UCC's laboratory tests in 1989 revealed that soil and water samples collected from near the factory and inside the plant were toxic to fish. Several other studies have shown polluted soil and groundwater in the area.

• Reported polluting compounds include naphthol^{[disambiguation needed ]}, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residue, mercury, toxic organochlorines, volatile organochlorine compounds, chromium, copper, nickel, lead, hexachloroethane, hexachlorobutadiene, and the pesticide HCH.

• In order to provide safe drinking water to the population around the UCC factory, there is a scheme for improvement of water supply.
• In December 2008, the Madhya Pradesh High Court decided that the toxic waste should be incinerated at Ankleshwar in Gujarat. 

 The most sad full moment is here don't watch it if u don't have the guts